Hello! Welcome to the next lesson in our course on the philosophy of justice.
In our last lesson, we explored Isaiah Berlin's defense of liberalism, which he grounded in the reality of value pluralism. This perspective argues for a society that tolerates diverse conceptions of the good life, seeing the freedom to choose between incommensurable values as a defining feature of human existence. At the heart of this liberal vision is a particular model of the person: the autonomous, rational individual as the author of their own life plan.
Today, we confront a powerful challenge to this very foundation. Our learning outcome is to explain the communitarian critique of liberal individualism and the 'unencumbered self'. We will delve into arguments from thinkers like Michael Sandel and Alasdair MacIntyre, who contend that the liberal conception of the self is a deeply flawed abstraction that ignores our essential embeddedness in communities, traditions, and social roles.
This critique is fundamental. It doesn't just question a particular policy or principle; it questions the very way liberalism conceives of the moral agent at the center of its theory.
1. The Liberal Self: An "Unencumbered" Agent
To understand the critique, we must first be precise about what is being critiqued. The liberal tradition, particularly in the work of John Rawls, imagines the moral person as an "unencumbered self."
This is a self that is, in a crucial sense, prior to its ends. We possess an identity that is independent of our aims, attachments, and conception of the good life. We are not defined by being a member of a particular family, nation, or religion; rather, we are free-choosing agents who happen to have these affiliations. The most vivid illustration of this is Rawls's "original position," where individuals behind a "veil of ignorance" choose principles of justice without knowing any of these particular facts about themselves.
To begin, let's watch a segment from a lecture by Michael Sandel, one of the most prominent critics of this view, as he explains the liberal position he intends to challenge.
Justice: What's The Right Thing To Do? Episode 11: "THE CLAIMS OF COMMUNITY"
In this clip from his famous 'Justice' course, Michael Sandel outlines the Kantian and Rawlsian conception of the self as a free, independent, and choosing agent, unbound by unchosen ties. This is the 'unencumbered self' that serves as the target for the communitarian critique.
Please watch the segment from 03:10 to 04:39. Pay close attention to the language used to describe this self: 'free and independent,' 'capable of choosing his or her own ends,' and 'unbound by any moral ties prior to our choosing them.'
As Sandel articulates, this vision is powerful and liberating. It suggests we are the sovereign authors of the moral obligations that constrain us. Any obligation we haven't chosen is not truly ours. This is the core of liberal individualism.
2. The Communitarian Rebuttal: The "Encumbered" Self
Communitarian thinkers argue that this picture of the unencumbered self is a philosophical fantasy that doesn't align with our deepest moral experiences. They contend that we are not, and cannot be, so detached from our social context.
To counter the 'unencumbered self', they propose a view of the self as "situated," "embedded," or "encumbered."
COMMUNITARIAN RESPONSE TO LIBERAL INDIVIDUALISM
This brief passage from the academic paper 'COMMUNITARIAN RESPONSE TO LIBERAL INDIVIDUALISM' concisely introduces the core communitarian idea of the 'situated self'.
Please read the 'Abstract' and the first paragraph under 'INTRODUCTION'. Focus on the contrast between the liberal 'isolated self' and the communitarian 'situated self' which is 'constituted through the community'.
The central idea is that our identity is not something we construct from scratch. We are born into a web of relationships, traditions, and histories that are partially constitutive of who we are. Our selves are "encumbered" by these attachments, not as burdens, but as the very sources of our identity and moral understanding.
One of the most influential formulations of this idea comes from the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre. Let's return to Sandel's lecture, where he explains MacIntyre's "narrative conception of the self."
Justice: What's The Right Thing To Do? Episode 11: "THE CLAIMS OF COMMUNITY"
Here, Sandel introduces Alasdair MacIntyre's powerful alternative to the liberal self. The idea is that we are 'storytelling creatures' whose moral lives can only be understood as part of a larger narrative we inherit.
Please watch from 04:39 to 10:31. Focus on how MacIntyre's 'narrative self' leads to the 'encumbered self' — a self that inherits debts, obligations, and expectations from the past that form its 'moral starting point.' Note the critique of liberal individualism as promoting a kind of 'historical amnesia' or 'moral shallowness.'
To summarize the key distinctions:
| The Unencumbered Self (Liberalism) | The Encumbered Self (Communitarianism) |
|---|---|
| The self is prior to its ends (goals, values, attachments). | The self is constituted by its ends. |
| We are defined by our capacity to choose. | We discover our identity within a social and historical context. |
| The self is detached, abstract, and universal. | The self is embedded, concrete, and particular. |
| Obligations are primarily chosen (consent/contract) or universal. | We have unchosen obligations of solidarity, membership, and loyalty. |
Your background in stochastic systems offers a potential analogy. The liberal self is like a memoryless process, where the next state is independent of the past. The communitarian self is path-dependent; its current identity and future possibilities are fundamentally shaped by the entire history of the process that led to it.
3. Moral Implications: Obligations of Solidarity
This philosophical dispute has profound practical consequences for our understanding of justice and moral obligation.
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A liberal framework tends to recognize two primary types of moral obligation:
- Natural duties owed to all human beings as rational agents (e.g., duty not to harm, duty of mutual respect). These are universal.
- Voluntary obligations incurred through consent (e.g., promises, contracts). These are particular.
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A communitarian framework insists on a third, crucial category:
3. Obligations of solidarity, loyalty, and membership. These are particular, like voluntary obligations, but they are not necessarily chosen. They arise from our identity as members of a family, a community, or a nation.
Sandel powerfully illustrates this third category with a series of challenging examples.
Justice: What's The Right Thing To Do? Episode 11: "THE CLAIMS OF COMMUNITY"
This section moves from theory to practice, exploring concrete cases where obligations of membership and solidarity seem to have real moral weight, even when they cannot be traced back to an act of consent.
Please watch three segments that explore these obligations: 10:48 - 12:55: Sandel introduces the idea of this third category of obligation. 12:55 - 17:04: He presents examples like family duties and patriotism. Consider whether you believe you have a stronger obligation to care for your own parent than a stranger's, and why. 38:24 - 45:34: The lecture culminates in real-world dilemmas that pit loyalty against universal principles, such as Robert E. Lee's choice to defend Virginia or a politician's loyalty to his fugitive brother. These are 'fair tests' of the communitarian claim.
These examples force us to ask whether a theory of justice that only allows for universal duties and voluntary contracts can fully capture our moral lives. The communitarian argues it cannot.
Test your understanding!
Imagine you are the founder of a technology company with offices in your home country (Country A) and another country (Country B). A market downturn forces you to lay off 10% of your workforce. From a purely economic standpoint, the cost savings are identical whether you make the cuts in Country A or Country B.
How might the "unencumbered self" and the "encumbered self" perspectives lead to different ways of thinking about this decision?
Show answer
The unencumbered self perspective, in its purest form, would argue that nationality is a morally arbitrary characteristic, much like hair color. The employees are all individuals with equal moral worth. Therefore, the decision should be based on neutral, objective criteria (e.g., performance, role redundancy) or even randomization, but not on national partiality. Any preference for employees in Country A would be a form of prejudice. The primary obligation is to the abstract principles of fairness and impartiality.
The encumbered self perspective would argue that your identity as a founder is partially constituted by your relationship to your home community (Country A). You may have unchosen obligations of solidarity to the society that nurtured you and your company. This doesn't mean you automatically fire everyone in Country B, but it means that loyalty to your home community is a morally relevant factor to weigh in the decision. It's not just prejudice; it's an acknowledgement of a special relationship and the obligations that flow from it. The decision becomes a tragic choice between competing loyalties and duties, not a simple application of a universal rule.
Conclusion
Today we have explored the communitarian critique of liberal individualism, a challenge that goes to the very heart of modern political theory. By questioning the coherence of the "unencumbered self," communitarians force us to reconsider the relationship between the individual, the community, and the nature of justice itself.
Key Takeaways:
- Liberalism, particularly in its Rawlsian form, is built upon the idea of an "unencumbered self"—an independent, rational agent whose identity is prior to its ends and community attachments.
- Communitarians critique this as an unrealistic abstraction, proposing instead an "encumbered" or "situated" self whose identity is constituted by its unchosen roles, history, and community narratives.
- This philosophical difference leads to different views on obligation. Communitarians argue for a third category beyond universal duties and voluntary contracts: obligations of solidarity and membership that are particular but not based on consent.
- This perspective shifts the focus of justice from a "politics of rights" for atomized individuals to a "politics of the common good" within a specific community.
Preview of the Next Lesson:
The communitarian critique naturally leads to our next topic. If the self is not a detached chooser, and if justice cannot be separated from the shared understandings of a community, this calls into question the liberal ideal of state neutrality. Next, we will examine perfectionist theories, which take this idea a step further, arguing that the state's role is not to be neutral, but to actively promote a particular vision of human excellence and the good life.