Hello! Welcome to your lesson.
In our last few sessions, we've examined different substantive theories of justice. We contrasted the liberal ideal of state neutrality with perfectionist theories, which argue that the state should actively promote a vision of human flourishing. Both of these, in their own way, propose a particular content for justice.
Today, we turn to a critique that challenges not just the content, but the very methodology of many liberal and libertarian theories. The learning outcome for this lesson is to use the communitarian critique to re-evaluate the universalist claims of liberal and libertarian theories. This critique questions the liberal project of deriving timeless, universal principles of justice from an abstract conception of the individual, arguing instead that our identities—and therefore our moral obligations—are deeply embedded in the communities we inhabit.
This debate gets to the heart of your interest in societal architecture: are the foundational rules of a society best derived from universal reason, or from the particular histories, traditions, and shared understandings of its people?
1. The Liberal Self and its Communitarian Challenge
The main target of the communitarian critique is the liberal conception of the person, often described as the "unencumbered self." This is the idea of an individual who is fundamentally a free, rational agent, prior to and independent of their particular goals, allegiances, and community ties. For this self, obligations arise in only two ways:
- Natural Duties: Universal duties owed to all persons simply because they are human (e.g., the duty not to murder).
- Voluntary Obligations: Particular duties we incur through consent (e.g., promises, contracts).
Communitarian thinkers like Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, and Charles Taylor argue that this picture is psychologically thin and morally incomplete. They propose a different view: the "encumbered" or "situated" self.
Justice: What's The Right Thing To Do? Episode 11: "THE CLAIMS OF COMMUNITY"
To grasp the core of this debate, we'll watch several segments from Michael Sandel's famous Harvard lecture, 'The Claims of Community'. He masterfully lays out the two opposing conceptions of the self and their implications for morality.
Please watch from 03:10 to 07:53. Focus on: Sandel's description of the Kantian/Rawlsian 'free and independent self' that chooses its own ends. The communitarian counter-argument that this view misses a key dimension of our moral experience. Alasdair MacIntyre's 'narrative conception of the self'—the idea that we understand our lives and moral duties through the stories and communities we are a part of.
As Sandel explains, MacIntyre argues that the question "What am I to do?" can only be answered by first addressing the question "Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?" From this "narrative" view, the self isn't an abstract choosing agent but a bearer of a particular social identity—a son, a citizen, a member of a profession. This identity comes with a history, debts, and expectations that are not of our own choosing, but which form the "given of our lives, our moral starting point."
2. Obligations of Solidarity: The Third Category
If the self is "encumbered" in this way, it implies that the liberal account of obligation is incomplete. Communitarians argue for a third category of obligation, distinct from universal duties and voluntary agreements.
- Obligations of Solidarity (or Membership): These are particular, unchosen responsibilities we have to those with whom we share a history, identity, or community.
These obligations are not universal (we don't owe them to everyone) and they are not based on consent (we don't choose our parents or our nation of birth). They arise from our membership in the narrative of a particular community.
Justice: What's The Right Thing To Do? Episode 11: "THE CLAIMS OF COMMUNITY"
Let's continue with Sandel's lecture, where he explains this third category of obligation and illustrates it with powerful examples.
Please watch from 10:48 to 17:04. As you watch, consider how these examples challenge a strictly universalist or consent-based view of morality: The special obligation to one's own child or parent. The French Resistance pilot who refuses to bomb his own village. The Israeli airlift of Ethiopian Jews and the broader question of patriotism.
These examples are designed to resonate with our moral intuitions. A universalist framework might struggle to justify saving your own child over another, as both are human beings with equal moral worth. A voluntarist framework struggles because you did not consent to have a greater obligation to your parents than to a stranger. Communitarians argue that only by acknowledging obligations of solidarity can we make sense of these powerful moral claims.
3. Re-evaluating Universalism: Loyalty vs. Principle
The communitarian critique gains its sharpest edge when these obligations of solidarity conflict with universal principles of justice. This forces a direct re-evaluation of the universalist claim that principles like justice or truthfulness should always take precedence.
These situations create what you've referred to as "least bad points" or what philosophers sometimes call "tragic choices," where any path taken involves a genuine moral loss.
Justice: What's The Right Thing To Do? Episode 11: "THE CLAIMS OF COMMUNITY"
The student discussion in Sandel's lecture presents several classic 'loyalty dilemmas' that pit particular obligations against universal ones. This is where the re-evaluation of universalism truly happens.
Please watch the segment from 30:41 to 49:24. This is a longer clip, but it's a rich exploration of the core conflict. Pay attention to these three key dilemmas: The Cheating Roommate: Should you report your roommate for cheating, upholding a universal principle of academic honesty, or remain loyal to a member of your immediate community? Billy Bulger: The Massachusetts politician who refused to help authorities locate his fugitive gangster brother. Does family loyalty outweigh civic duty and the demands of justice? Robert E. Lee: The Union officer who, despite opposing secession, chose to fight for his home state of Virginia. Does loyalty to 'his people' and 'his home' justifiably compete with the universal claims of union and abolition?
These cases challenge the clean, abstract nature of universalist theories. They suggest that a person who didn't feel the pull of loyalty—who would turn in their brother or bomb their hometown without a moment's hesitation—might be morally deficient, not morally exemplary. The communitarian claim is that our particular attachments have a moral weight of their own and cannot simply be dismissed as sentiment or prejudice in the face of abstract principles.
Test your understanding!
Consider a libertarian like Robert Nozick, whose Entitlement Theory rests on universal principles of just acquisition and transfer. How does the communitarian argument, especially as illustrated by the Robert E. Lee example, challenge the universalist foundation of his theory?
Show answer
Nozick's theory is "historical" but its principles are universal and ahistorical—they are meant to apply to anyone, anywhere, at any time. Justice is a matter of whether the current distribution of property arose through a chain of legitimate, voluntary transactions, regardless of the community's traditions or values.
The Robert E. Lee example fundamentally challenges this. Lee's dilemma isn't about property rights or voluntary contracts. It's about a deep, unchosen loyalty to his "native state" and "his people." From a strict Nozickian (or any universalist liberal) perspective, if Virginia's secession was unjust (a violation of the social contract or individual rights), then Lee's duty was clear: he should have sided with the Union. His loyalty to Virginia is a mere sentiment, irrelevant to the question of justice.
The communitarian critique, however, suggests Lee's choice is a genuine moral dilemma precisely because his identity is constituted by his being a Virginian. His obligation to this community is not something he can simply set aside. This implies that principles of justice might not be derivable from a universal, abstract standpoint alone. They might be deeply intertwined with, and sometimes subordinate to, the claims of the particular communities that shape who we are. It suggests that a theory of justice that has no room for the moral weight of such loyalties is incomplete.
4. From the Self to Justice: Historicism vs. Universalism
The critique of the unencumbered self logically extends to a critique of universal justice. If our moral identity is rooted in specific communities and traditions, then our understanding of justice might be as well.
This pits liberal universalism against communitarian historicism (or particularism).
- Liberal Universalism: Argues that principles of justice (like Rawls's) are valid for all societies because they are what free and rational individuals would choose from an impartial standpoint (like the "original position"). They provide an "Archimedean point" to judge any society.
- Communitarian Historicism: Argues that standards of justice are found within the "forms of life" and traditions of particular societies. Justice is about fidelity to the shared understandings of a community's members. There is no external, universal standpoint.
Communitarianism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Communitarianism provides a superb analysis of this very debate, tracing its philosophical origins and its real-world political expressions.
Please read Section 1, 'Universalism Versus Particularism.' Focus on how communitarians like MacIntyre, Taylor, and Walzer challenged Rawls's universalist pretensions. Also, pay close attention to the discussion of the 'Asian values' debate as a concrete political manifestation of this philosophical tension. This connects directly to your interest in different macro-level societal architectures.
As the article notes, this critique had a significant impact, pushing Rawls himself towards a more "political" and less metaphysical justification for his theory in his later work. The communitarian challenge forces universalists to ask whether their principles are truly universal or merely the parochial values of Western liberal societies projected onto the world.
5. The Limits of the Critique
Of course, the communitarian position faces powerful objections. Tying justice to the shared understandings of a community is perilous.
What if the community's traditions are oppressive? As Michael Walzer noted, the Indian caste system could be seen as "just" according to its own internal, shared meanings. The same could be said for societies built on slavery or segregation. The communitarian view risks losing the critical standpoint from which to condemn unjust traditions. A universal principle of human dignity, for example, is precisely what allows us to say that a caste society is unjust, regardless of its shared understandings.
Sandel himself concludes his lecture with this sobering point, showing footage of segregationists defending their "way of life." The communitarian must answer how they can avoid this slide into relativism, where justice becomes nothing more than convention.
Conclusion
Today we have explored the communitarian critique, a profound challenge to the foundations of liberal and libertarian thought. It forces a re-evaluation of whether universal principles, derived from an abstract individual, are a sufficient basis for a theory of justice.
Key Takeaways:
- The Unencumbered vs. Encumbered Self: The core of the debate is a conflict between the liberal view of a self that chooses its ends and the communitarian view of a self that is constituted by its unchosen attachments and community narratives.
- Obligations of Solidarity: The "encumbered self" gives rise to a third category of moral claims—obligations of loyalty and membership—that can compete with universal duties and voluntary contracts.
- Universalism vs. Historicism: The critique extends from the self to justice itself, questioning whether justice is a set of timeless, universal principles or is instead relative to the shared understandings of particular historical communities.
- Re-evaluation, Not Rejection: The communitarian critique does not necessarily lead to a total rejection of liberalism. Rather, it exposes potential blind spots and forces a re-evaluation of the moral weight of community, tradition, and particular attachments alongside universal principles.
- Inherent Dangers: The communitarian position faces its own major challenge: how to ground a critique of unjust traditions if justice is defined by a community's own shared understandings.
Preview of the Next Lesson:
This lesson has highlighted the deep, substantive disagreements about the very source of justice—is it the rational individual or the historical community? Given this impasse, some philosophers have proposed a radical shift in focus. If we can't agree on what outcome is just, perhaps we can agree on a fair process for making decisions. In our next lesson, we will explain procedural justice as the fairness of decision-making processes, sometimes independent of outcomes. This will move us into the final set of alternative theories of justice.