Critiquing Rawls: Libertarian and Communitarian Perspectives

Introduction

Welcome back. In our previous lesson, we explored the core of John Rawls's vision: his two principles of justice. We saw how the Liberty Principle secures basic rights, while the Second Principle, with its demands for Fair Equality of Opportunity and the Difference Principle, aims to construct an economic order that is justifiable to all, especially the least advantaged. The moral foundation of this project is the powerful claim that the distribution of natural talents and social starting positions is morally arbitrary, and so these contingencies should be arranged to serve as a "common asset."

Today, we put this grand theory to the test. Our learning outcome is to critique the assumptions of Rawls's model from both libertarian and communitarian perspectives. We will examine two of the most significant lines of attack that emerged in the wake of A Theory of Justice. From the right, the libertarian critique argues that Rawls's system sacrifices individual liberty for the sake of an imposed pattern of equality. From a different angle, the communitarian critique challenges the very foundation of Rawls's method, questioning the abstract, individualistic model of the person from which the principles are derived.

This lesson will probe the foundations of the Rawlsian project, helping us understand its potential vulnerabilities and the profound philosophical disagreements it brings to the surface.

1. The Core Premise Under Attack: Rawls's Rejection of Desert

Before we dive into the critiques, it's crucial to recall the provocative assumption that motivates Rawls's entire redistributive framework: his deep skepticism about moral desert. He argues that the factors that lead to success—innate talent, a supportive family, even a conscientious character—are so heavily influenced by the "natural and social lotteries" that they cannot form a basis for deserving a greater share of society's resources.

To see this argument laid out, let's start with a short video that explains Rawls's starting point of treating natural endowments as a matter of luck.

This rejection of pre-institutional desert is the philosophical engine of the Difference Principle. It sets the stage for a system where society can arrange its basic structure to channel the benefits of these "undeserved" talents for the common good. Now, let's see how the critics respond.

2. The Libertarian Critique: Liberty, Rights, and Patterns

The most famous libertarian critique of Rawls comes from his Harvard colleague, Robert Nozick, in his 1974 book Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Nozick argues that Rawls's focus on a fair outcome (a "patterned" or "end-state" distribution) fundamentally violates individual rights and the justice of historical processes.

A helpful overview of the libertarian and communitarian critiques is provided in the paper "A critical analysis of Rawls, Nozick, and contemporary theories."

2.1. The Conflict between Liberty and Equality

For libertarians like Nozick, the central flaw in Rawls's system is that enforcing the Difference Principle requires continuous and illegitimate interference with individual liberty. It elevates a desired pattern of distribution over the rights of individuals to their own holdings.

In a fascinating discussion between political theorist Josh Cohen and economist Glenn Loury, Loury forcefully articulates the core of this libertarian challenge.

Loury's points capture the essence of the libertarian critique:

1. Taxation as Coercion: To fund the redistribution required by the Difference Principle, the state must tax individuals, which Nozick famously described as being "on a par with forced labor." It treats productive people as a resource for others, violating their self-ownership.
2. Infringing on the Private Sphere: Fully realizing Rawls's "fair equality of opportunity" could require massive state intervention into family life to correct for the advantages that attentive, well-resourced parents give their children. This represents an unacceptable encroachment on the liberty of the family.

2.2. The Rawlsian Defense: Distinguishing Liberties

How does a Rawlsian respond? The defense hinges on a crucial distinction between different types of liberties. Not all liberties are created equal in Rawls's system.

The Rawlsian counter-argument is that the Liberty Principle protects a specific, fully adequate scheme of basic liberties, not "liberty as such."

• Basic Liberties (freedom of conscience, speech, association, political participation) are nearly absolute and cannot be traded for economic benefits.
• Economic Liberties (unrestricted property rights, freedom of contract) are not part of this sacrosanct scheme. They can and should be regulated to achieve the goals of the Second Principle, including the Difference Principle.

For Nozick, this is an arbitrary distinction. For Rawls, it is the only way to achieve what he calls the "reconciliation of liberty and equality."

3. The Communitarian Critique: The Self and the Social Context

If the libertarian critique attacks Rawls's conclusions, the communitarian critique attacks his very starting point: the model of the person in the Original Position. Thinkers like Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, and Alasdair MacIntyre argue that Rawls's theory is built on a flawed and overly abstract conception of the self.

The core of the argument is that Rawls imagines an "unencumbered self"—a self that is prior to and independent of its values, attachments, and community ties. Communitarians argue this is a fiction. We are all "encumbered selves," whose identities are partly constituted by our families, communities, and traditions. We don't just choose our ends; we often discover them through our social context.

A detailed and rigorous analysis of this line of critique is presented in the paper "A CRITIquE OF JOHN RAWLS’ POLITICAL LIBERALISM" by Wanpat Youngmevittaya. This paper is philosophically dense, but your background makes you well-equipped to tackle its core arguments.

Let's distill the key arguments from this powerful critique:

1. A Critique from Political Economy & Social Choice Theory:

   • The Original Position is not a real contract or social choice. Since everyone is made identical behind the Veil of Ignorance (equally rational, risk-averse, etc.), it's just one person making a rational choice under uncertainty.
   • As your economics background suggests, different assumptions about rationality lead to different outcomes. Harsanyi argued that if parties were classical utility-maximizers, they'd choose to maximize average utility, not use maximin. Rawls's result is baked in by his assumptions.
   • By "forcing" everyone into the same preference structure, Rawls sidesteps the paradoxes of preference aggregation (like those in Arrow's Theorem) rather than solving them.

2. A Philosophical Critique of the 'Unencumbered Self':

   • The central claim is that justice cannot be detached from conceptions of the good. The Original Position forces us to adopt a particular view of the person: one for whom the self is prior to its ends.
   • This view of the self is not neutral. It reflects a modern, Western, liberal individualism. It is not a universal truth but one specific, comprehensive moral doctrine among many.
   • Therefore, Rawls's project fails in its own terms. It doesn't find principles of justice that are neutral between competing moral doctrines. Instead, it elevates one (liberal individualism) over all others (e.g., those based on tradition, religion, or communal identity).

Conclusion

Today we've subjected Rawls's elegant theoretical edifice to a formidable cross-examination. We've seen that its assumptions, while powerful, are not unassailable.

Key Takeaways:

• Libertarian Critique: Rawls's system, particularly the Difference Principle, requires unacceptable infringements on individual liberty and property rights. It prioritizes a "patterned" distribution over the justice of historical entitlement and voluntary exchange, effectively treating individuals as means to a collective end.
• Communitarian Critique: Rawls's entire method is flawed because it rests on an unrealistic and non-neutral model of the "unencumbered self." By abstracting individuals from their social context, it promotes a specific, comprehensive liberal individualism while claiming a neutrality it cannot deliver. Justice, for communitarians, is not found in abstraction but is interpreted from within the shared life of a community.

These critiques reveal a fundamental fault line in political philosophy. The libertarian critique champions a 'natural justice' of individual rights and desert based on action. The communitarian critique suggests that justice itself is a social, not universal, concept. Rawls's attempt to navigate between these positions remains one of the most influential, and contested, projects in modern thought.

Preview of the next lesson:

Having now examined the most powerful critique from the 'natural rights' perspective, we will dedicate the next module to exploring that view in its own right. We will begin by delving into the positive theory of justice proposed by Robert Nozick, explaining his famous Entitlement Theory based on the principles of just acquisition, transfer, and rectification.