Hello again. In our last lesson, we examined the Euthyphro to understand Socrates' powerful method of refutation, the elenchus. We saw how he systematically dismantled Euthyphro's attempts to define piety, leaving him in a state of confusion, or aporia.
The dialogue culminated in Socrates posing one of the most famous questions in the history of philosophy:
"Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?"
Last time, we focused on this question as a tool of the elenchus—a way for Socrates to show that Euthyphro's definition was inadequate. Today, we will shift our focus from the method to the substance of this question. Our goal is to analyze the Euthyphro dilemma and its profound implications for the relationship between piety and the gods, and more broadly, between morality and divine authority.
This dilemma has echoed through centuries of theological and philosophical debate, and understanding it is a crucial step in your study.
The Heart of the Matter: Explanatory Priority
Before we dissect the two sides of the dilemma, let's make sure we understand the structure of the question itself. Socrates is asking about what philosophers call explanatory priority. In simple terms, he's asking: which of the two things—piety or divine love—explains the other? Which is the cause and which is the effect?
Let's begin by revisiting the primary text where Socrates makes this crucial move.
Please read the section of Plato's 'Euthyphro' where Socrates formulates the dilemma. This is the core passage for today's lesson.
Please read from Stephanus page 10a to 11b. In the provided PDF, this starts with Socrates asking, 'Consider this: Is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious...?' and ends just before he says, 'Now, if you will, do not hide things from me...'. Focus on the analogies Socrates uses (carrying/carried, seeing/seen) to clarify his point to Euthyphro.
Socrates' analogies about "carrying" and "seeing" can be a bit dense. To clarify this concept of explanatory priority, let's watch a video that uses a very intuitive modern analogy.
Plato's Euthyphro - Which comes first: God or Morality?
This video from Jeffrey Kaplan's channel offers a crystal-clear explanation of explanatory priority using the analogy of 'grass is green.' This will help you grasp the logical structure of Socrates' question.
Watch from 09:41 to 15:41. Pay close attention to how the question 'Is grass green because the sentence 'grass is green' is true?' is unpacked. This will give you a solid framework for analyzing the two horns of the dilemma.
Now that we have a firm grasp on what the question is asking, let's explore each of the two possible answers—the two "horns" of the dilemma.
Horn 1: "The pious is loved by the gods because it is pious."
Euthyphro, with Socrates' guidance, chooses this option. Let's analyze its implications.
If an action is loved by the gods because it's pious, this means that piety is an intrinsic quality of the action itself. The action possesses a characteristic—piety—that exists independently of the gods' feelings about it.
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Implication: Morality is independent of divine authority. The gods are not the source or creators of what is good; they are excellent recognizers of it. They love what is pious because they are wise enough to perceive its inherent moral worth. There is a standard of goodness that is external to, and perhaps even above, the gods themselves.
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The Socratic Problem: While this might seem like a plausible answer, Socrates points out a critical flaw in the context of their conversation. If the gods' love is merely a response to piety, then "being loved by the gods" is just an attribute or a quality (pathos in Greek) that piety happens to have. It is not its essence or nature (eidos). Euthyphro was asked for a definition of piety, but he has only provided a secondary feature. The fundamental question—"What makes an action pious in the first place?"—is left completely unanswered.
This video clip explores this first horn in detail.
Plato, Euthyphro | The Euthyphro Dilemma | Philosophy Core Concepts
Gregory Sadler, in his 'Philosophy Core Concepts' series, breaks down this first horn of the dilemma.
Watch from 02:40 to 05:37. Notice how he explains that this option posits an 'intrinsic value' in the action that pre-exists the gods' approval.
Horn 2: "It is pious because it is loved by the gods."
Although Socrates and Euthyphro don't explore this path in detail, it is the other logical possibility and has been the subject of immense philosophical debate. This view is often called Divine Command Theory.
This position holds that an action has no intrinsic moral status. Its moral value is conferred upon it entirely by the will or love of the gods.
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Implication: Morality is dependent on divine authority. The gods are the ultimate source and creators of what is good. Goodness is whatever the gods happen to love or command.
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The Problem of Arbitrariness: This horn solves the definitional problem—piety is simply that which the gods love—but it creates a new, more troubling issue. If the gods' love is what makes an action pious, what if they were to love cruelty, theft, or dishonesty? Would those actions then become pious? This makes morality seem completely arbitrary and subject to divine whim. It detaches morality from any basis in reason, harm, or human welfare, grounding it purely in an act of will.
The following video explores this second horn and its disturbing consequences through a powerful thought experiment.
Plato's Euthyphro - Which comes first: God or Morality?
Let's return to Jeffrey Kaplan's video, where he masterfully analyzes the second horn and the problem of arbitrariness.
Watch from 20:26 to 26:49. He extends the argument to a monotheistic context and uses a stark thought experiment to illustrate why making morality entirely dependent on God's will can be deeply problematic.
The Dilemma Visualized
The dilemma forces a difficult choice upon anyone who wants to ground morality in divine will. Either morality is independent of the gods (which seems to diminish their supreme authority), or it is dependent on them (which seems to make morality arbitrary).
This flowchart modernizes the dilemma, framing it in the monotheistic terms that have dominated later discussions.

It is worth noting, as a point of scholarly accuracy, that Plato's primary goal here was likely to demonstrate the failure of Euthyphro's definition and to distinguish between a thing's essence and its attributes. However, the dilemma's implications have far outgrown its original context, posing a fundamental challenge for many religious and ethical systems.
Conclusion
Today we have moved beyond the Socratic method as a mere technique and engaged with its powerful philosophical product. By analyzing the Euthyphro dilemma, we have uncovered a deep and persistent problem at the intersection of ethics and theology.
Key Takeaways:
- The Euthyphro Dilemma asks whether something is good because God (or the gods) commands it, or whether God commands it because it is good. This is a question of explanatory priority.
- Horn 1 suggests that morality is independent of God. This preserves the non-arbitrariness of morality but fails to define it and potentially limits divine sovereignty.
- Horn 2 suggests that morality is dependent on God (Divine Command Theory). This defines morality but makes it potentially arbitrary, as what is good could change at God's whim.
- The dilemma reveals a fundamental tension in trying to derive the content of morality from a divine source. It forces us to ask whether God is the creator of moral value or its most perfect recognizer.
In the Euthyphro, the charges against Socrates are a backdrop to the philosophical discussion. In our next lesson, we will see Socrates at the center of the drama. We will turn to Plato's Apology to reconstruct the main arguments of Socrates' defense against the formal and informal charges brought against him by the city of Athens.
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